The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 20

Number 2

Article 3

3-1-2022

Contemplating Arbitration in Disputed Congressional Elections: A
Case Study with the Closest Senate Election in U.S. History
Ben Sheppard

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Ben Sheppard, Contemplating Arbitration in Disputed Congressional Elections: A Case Study with the
Closest Senate Election in U.S. History, 20 U.N.H. L. Rev. 229 (2022).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce School
of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of
New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more
information, please contact sue.zago@law.unh.edu.

®
Ben Sheppard

Contemplating Arbitration in Disputed Congressional
Elections: A Case Study with the Closest Senate Election
in U.S. History
20 U.N.H. L. Rev. 229 (2022)

In the US, elections are a hotly contested fare. The stakes are higher when the
election’s outcome is decided by a razor-thin margin. These close elections often lead to lengthy
court battles coupled with bitter and angry candidates and voters. One such example is the 1974
U.S. Senate Election in New Hampshire—a contest decided by only two votes. That election and
the events following it are chronicled in this Article. This Article considers that contest to
contemplate the use of arbitration in contested Congressional election. Ultimately, the author
argues Congress should create a three-person arbitration panel to handle disputed Congressional
elections to allow Congress to focus on other pressing issues, ensure transparency, and fairness.
ABSTRACT.
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Article and for a wonderful Alternative Dispute Resolution Class. Additionally, the author would
like to thank Professors Brian S. Harvey & Liza Craig (Mediation) and Professor Robin Juni
(Negotiations) for fantastic ADR classes in law school. The author may be contacted at
bsheppard@law.gwu.edu.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2020, amidst the backdrop of a global pandemic and a tumultuous
presidential election, one of the closest Congressional elections in recent memory
occurred.1 That race occurred in Iowa’s Second Congressional district.2 It pitted
Republican state senator Mariannette Miller-Meeks against Democratic state
senator Rita Hart. 3 On November 30, following a recount, the bipartisan Iowa
Board of Canvass voted 5–0 to certify Miller-Meeks as the victor by just six votes
(196,964–196,958).4
Despite the Iowa Board of Canvass’ decision, the race was not over. Hart
challenged the results via a petition with the U.S. House Administration Committee
under the 1969 Federal Contested Elections Act, which governs contested
Congressional election procedures.5 Under the U.S. Constitution each chamber of
Congress is “the [j]udge of the [e]lections, [r]eturns and [q]ualifications of its own
[m]embers.”6 Hart’s petition challenged the Iowa Board of Canvass’ decision to not
count twenty-two ballots—a decision that impacted the outcome.7
Tom Barton, Hart Pushes Ahead with Iowa’s 2nd Congressional District Challenge as Some Democrats
Balk at Overturning Race, Quad City Times (Mar. 23, 2021), https://qctimes.com/news/local/hartpushes-ahead-with-iowas-2nd-congressional-district-challenge-as-some-democrats-balk-atoverturning/article_a3bdddd6-674e-598d-a651-c1b85081632c.html
[https://perma.cc/LR6F-UGYP]; Ben Kamisar, Iowa Congressional Race Likely to be One of Closest in
Modern History, Meet the Press Blog: Latest news, analysis and data driving the political discussion, NBC
News: Meet the Press Blog (Dec. 21, 2021, 2:01 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meetthe-press/blog/meet-press-blog-latest-news-analysis-data-driving-political-discussionn988541/ncrd1249575#blogHeader [https://perma.cc/KF69-V343] (“When Iowa's State Canvassing
Board certified its 2020 election results on Monday, Republican Mariannette Miller-Meeks edged
out Democrat Rita Hart in the state's Second Congressional District by just six votes, making it
one of the closest U.S. House races in modern history.”).

1

2

Barton, supra note 1.

See Luke Martz, Momentum for Miller-Meeks, Iowa Field Report (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.iowafieldreport.com/campaigns/momentum-for-miller-meeks/
[https://perma.cc/Q2CB-FEA7].

3

Ryan J. Foley, Iowa Board Certifies 6-vote Republican Win in US House Race, AP News
(Nov. 30, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-donald-trump-iowa-mariannettemiller-meeks-elections-e3f235f217707a78fcec059f8e0b4ffa [https://perma.cc/D36W-4B67].

4

See Paul Brennan, Rita Hart Will Ask the U.S. House of Representatives to Conduct a Recount of Votes
in the 2nd District, Little Village (Dec. 2, 2020), https://littlevillagemag.com/rita-hart-asks-ushouse-for-recount/ [https://perma.cc/YHP9-AZ42].

5

6

U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.

Christopher Branuschweig, HART: 22 Ballots ‘Unlawfully Excluded’ from State-Certified Results,
Newton Daily News (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.newtondailynews.com/news/local/

7
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In December 2020, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) seated MillerMeeks provisionally pending adjudication of Hart’s petition. 8 It was a real
possibility the House would overturn the Iowa Board of Canvass’ decision and install
Hart as the Representative for Iowa’s Second Congressional District.9 Such a result
was not inconceivable because Democrats had a small majority in the House of
Representatives.10 Naturally, Republicans cried foul at the prospect of Democratic
members of Congress overturning a state election board’s ruling. 11 In addition,
Democratic politicians 12 and commentators 13 expressed concern regarding Hart’s
challenge.
Ultimately, Hart dropped her challenge regarding Iowa’s Second Congressional
District results on March 31, 2021. 14 “Despite our best efforts to have every vote
counted, the reality is that the toxic campaign of political disinformation to attack
2020/12/24/hart-22-ballots-unlawfully-excluded-from-state-certified-results/
[https://perma.cc/T72F-3FQS].
Sarah Ferris et al., Pelosi to Seat Republican in Contested Iowa Race, Politico (Dec. 30, 2020,
12:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/30/pelosi-seats-iowa-mariannette-millermeeks-452332 [https://perma.cc/2RYN-9KPS].

8

See Kerry Pickett, House Democrats trying to ‘steal’ contested Iowa seat, GOP lawmaker says,
Washington Examiner (Mar. 21, 2021), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/gopdemocrats-steal-iowa-house-seat-by-republicans-process

9

See Ally Mutnick et al., Dems Sound Alarm at Prospect of Overturning Iowa Race, Politico (Mar.
22, 2021, 8:04 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/22/democrats-iowa-race-477497
[https://perma.cc/NNW8-8BLT].

10

E.g., David N. Bossie, Pelosi and Dems Have a New Target in their Quest for Election Control – Iowa
Rep. Miller-Meeks, Fox News (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/pelosidemocrats-target-election-control-iowa-miller-meeks-david-bossie
[https://perma.cc/Q494-S249]; Lachlan Markay, Senate Republicans Warn Corporate America over
Iowa House Race, Axios (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.axios.com/iowa-house-capitol-riotdonation-d6175f8b-f39e-4b09-b59c-269448ee2ee9.html [https://perma.cc/FVZ4-CRDY].

11

E.g., Dean Phillips (@RepDeanPhillips) Twitter (Mar. 22, 2021, 9:51 AM),
https://twitter.com/RepDeanPhillips/status/1373995713512759297?s=20 [https://perma.cc/28H5ZFAB] (“Losing a House election by six votes is painful for Democrats. But overturning it in the
House would be even more painful for America. Just because a majority can, does not mean a
majority should.”); see also Kristina Peterson, Iowa Election Challenge Alarms Some House Democrats,
Wall Street J. (Mar. 25, 2021, 4:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/iowa-electionchallengealarms-some-house-democrats-11616677200 [https://perma.cc/CGX3-LHQV].

12

E.g., Dylan McCloskey, Democracy Under Attack: Iowa’s ‘Bloody Second, 60 St. Louis Univ. L. J.
Online 1, 1 (2021) (arguing Hart’s challenge attacked American democracy).

13

Sarah Ferris & Ally Mutnick, Democrat Drops Election Contest in Iowa House Race, Politico
(Mar. 31, 2021, 5:37 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/31/democrat-drops-electioncontest-in-iowa-house-race-478736 [https://perma.cc/G8LX-GRR8].

14
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this constitutional review of the closest congressional contest in one hundred years
has effectively silenced the voices of Iowans,” Hart wrote in a statement regarding
her withdrawal.15 While Hart dropped her challenge under the Federal Contested
Elections Act, it is likely that similar challenges will arise in the future. In the 2020
Congressional elections alone, six races were decided by one percent or less.16
And such a problem is not new to Congress, as many Congressional elections
have been remarkably close in American history. 17 In fact, one Congressional
election was even closer than the recent Iowa race. That race was the 1974 U.S.
Senate election in New Hampshire where Republican Congressman Louis C.
Wyman defeated Democratic State Insurance Commissioner John A. Durkin by
only two votes.18 The Wyman v. Durkin contest lasted for over ten months and was
fraught with court battles and bitter partisanship in the U.S. Senate.19
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I gives a brief history of the contested
1974 New Hampshire Senate race. Part II outlines the benefits of arbitration for
resolving contested election disputes in comparison to mediation or litigation. Part
III offers a proposed statutory modification to the Federal Contested Elections Act
to convene an arbitration panel for contested Congressional elections.

15

Id.

Election Results, 2020: Congressional Elections Decided by 10 Percentage Points or Fewer,
Ballotpedia (Feb. 8, 2021), https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2020:_Congressional_
elections_decided_by_10_percentage_points_or_fewer [https://perma.cc/RS3K-Q6V5].
Like
Iowa, New York witnessed an exceptionally close Congressional contest in 2020. In New York’s
22nd Congressional District, Republican Claudia Tenney defeated Democratic Representative
Anthony Brindisi by only 109 votes. New York’s 22nd Congressional District Election, 2020,
Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/New_York%27s_22nd_Congressional_District_election,
_2020 [https://perma.cc/KK5G-C2EE].

16

Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 26–
27, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (No. 07-21, 07-25), 2007 WL
4340892; Madeline Farber, 5 of the Closest Congressional Races of the Past 50 years, Fox News (Nov. 6,
2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/5-of-the-closest-house-and-senate-races-of-the-past50-years [https://perma.cc/8PA3-XM85]; see also Eliott C. McLaughlin, 11 of the Most Bizarre Elections
in American History, CNN Politics (Nov. 16, 2020, 10:09 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/16/
politics/interesting-us-elections-trump-biden/index.html [https://perma.cc/HJ3Z-BLDA].

17

18

See Farber, supra note 17.

See Richard W. Osborne, My Turn: Reflecting on the Closest Race in U.S. Senate History, Concord
Monitor (Oct. 20, 2020, 7:47 AM), https://www.concordmonitor.com/My-Turn-Osbourne36852978 [https://perma.cc/M2S2-DZ4Q].

19

233

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

I.

20:2 (2022)

THE CLOSEST SENATE ELECTION IN U.S. HISTORY

This section provides a historic overview of the 1974 New Hampshire Senate
election—the closest Senate election in U.S. history. It first considers the campaign
itself. Next, the ensuing battle for the seat that featured court battles and a lengthy
Senate contest are examined. After much consternation, the candidates finally held
a special election, ten months after the original election.20
A. The Campaign
In 1974, New Hampshire experienced political change. The incumbent,
Republican Senator Norris Cotton, decided to retire.21 Cotton’s retirement kicked
off two primaries. 22 The Republicans selected five-term Congressman Louis C.
Wyman.23 By contrast, the Democrats nominated populist former State Insurance
Commissioner John A. Durkin, who frequently made headlines for challenging
insurance companies on behalf of consumers.24
At the outset of the campaign, Wyman was considered the favorite.25 However,
two events altered the course of the race.26 First, the Durkin campaign aired ads
that lambasted Wyman for hosting elite Washington cocktail parties to raise
campaign funds. 27 The spots showcased clinking glasses in the background. 28
Second, the resignation of President Richard Nixon amidst the cloud of the
Watergate scandal occurred only three months before the election.29 The Watergate

Monica Davey & Carl Hulse, Franken’s Win Bolsters Democratic Grip in Senate, N.Y. Times
(June 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/politics/01minnesota.html
[https://perma.cc/KFX3-8H62].

20

Christopher Lydon, Republican Strategists See Major 1974 Election Losses for G.O.P., N.Y. Times
(Dec. 17, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/17/archives/republican-strategists-see-major1974-election-losses-for-gop-most.html [https://perma.cc/URM3-U9T8].

21

22

See Osborne, supra note 19.

23

Id.

See In Memoriam: Sen. John A. Durkin, N.H. Bar News, Nov. 16, 2012, at 1, 10 [hereinafter
Durkin Memoriam].

24

25

Osborne, supra note 19.

26

John Gizzi, Louis Wyman, R.I.P., Human Events, May 27, 2002, at 11.

27

Gizzi, supra note 26, at 11; Osborne, supra note 19.

28

Gizzi, supra note 26, at 11.

29

See id.
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scandal hindered Republican electoral prospects across the United States.30
Such events conspired to make for a memorable election day in New
Hampshire. As ballots trickled in, the race was exceptionally close.31 The next day,
early counts caused the New Hampshire Secretary of State to declare Wyman “won”
the race by 355 votes.32
B. Recounts, Recounts, and Court Challenges
A razor-thin margin like this naturally sparked a recount. Immediately after
the election, a painstaking hand recount commenced until November 27, 1974, and
reversed the result.33 Now Durkin was declared the winner by just ten votes.34
Yet, the dispute continued.35 New Hampshire law permitted additional review
by the state’s Ballot Law Commission (“BLC”), a three-member board with plenary
authority over issues concerning recounts. 36 Given the closeness of the race,
Wyman appealed to the BLC on November 29, 1974.37
At the time when Wyman raised his appeal, the BLC had two Republicans and
one Democrat as its members. 38 The BLC reviewed the evidence concerning the
Senate contest and issued a 2–1 ruling favoring Wyman with Crowley, the
Democratic member, dissenting.39 The BLC declared Wyman the winner by only
two votes.40 After this decision, Governor Meldrim Thomson, Jr. awarded Wyman
a certificate of election, a credential necessary for a seat in the U.S. Senate.41
Subsequently, Durkin challenged the constitutionality of the BLC’s decision in
See Josh Chafetz, Congressional Overspeech, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 529, 568–69 (2020); Laura
Kalman, Gerald Ford, the Nixon Pardon, and the Rise of the Right, 58 Clev. St. L. Rev. 349, 364–65
(2010).

30

31

Osborne, supra note 19.

32

Id.

Edward B. Foley, Ballot Battles: The History of Disputed Elections in the United
States 251 (Oxford University Press, 2016).

33

34

Durkin Memoriam, supra note 24.

35

Id.

36

See Foley, supra note 30, at 251.

37

Durkin v. Snow, 403 F. Supp. 18, 18 (D.N.H. 1974).

Roger Crowley was the Democrat member. Foley, supra note 33, at 251. He was considered
too closely tied to the Republican Party. Id. Additionally, Crowley’s son had briefly worked for
Wyman. Id.

38

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

See id.
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the courts.42 First, Durkin appealed to the U.S. District Court of New Hampshire
which held the BLC’s proceedings were constitutional because states are granted
broad powers to verify the integrity of election results.43 Second, Durkin challenged
the results in New Hampshire state courts multiple times without success.44 Yet,
Durkin remained undeterred and pursued his challenge.
C. A Petty and Partisan Senate Debate
After a panoply of unsuccessful court challenges, Durkin appealed to the Senate
under the Federal Contested Elections Act.45 He alleged that the BLC made errors
in reviewing contested votes.46 When Wyman presented his certificate of elections
credential to the Senate, they declined to accept it—even provincially— in a straight
party-line vote.47 Such a result left New Hampshire with only one Senator.
After refusing to recognize Wyman’s credential, the Senate voted 58–34 to refer
the matter to the Rules Committee.48 The Rules Committee was chaired by Senator
Howard Cannon (D-NV) and comprised of five Democrats and three Republicans.49
From the beginning of February until the end of April, the Rules Committee
attempted to recount the contested ballots in the New Hampshire contest.50 One
Senator on the Rules Committee, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), argued that
the actual counting of the N.H. ballots, and as much as possible of the procedural
decision-making relative to the N.H. Senate election contest, should not be done by
elected individuals, but should have been delegated to a neutral body chosen from a
panel recommended by the American Arbitration Association or other impartial source

See The Election Case of John A. Durkin v. Louis C. Wyman of New Hampshire (1975), United States
Senate [hereinafter United States Senate Election Case], https://www.senate.gov/about/originsfoundations/electing-appointing-senators/contested-senate-elections/137Durkin_Wyman.htm
[https://perma.cc/7HS4-TAS4].

42

43

See Snow, 403 F. Supp. at 18–19.

Durkin v. Hillsborough Cnty. Super. Ct., 330 A.2d 777 (N.H. 1974); Op. of the Justices, 330
A.2d 774 (N.H. 1974); Wyman v. Durkin, 330 A.2d 772 (N.H. 1974).

44

See Luis Kutner, Due Process in the Contested New Hampshire Senate Election: Fact, Fiction, or Farce,
11 New Eng. L. Rev. 25, 28 (1975).

45

46

Id.

47

Foley, supra note 33, at 252.

48

Kutner, supra note 45, at 29.

49

Foley, supra note 33, at 252.

50

Kutner, supra note 45, at 29.
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agreed upon by the contestants.51

But Pell’s wise suggestion was never heeded, and the Rules Committee referred the
matter to the whole Senate on May 22, 1975, after being unable to resolve the
dispute.52
After this impasse, the Senate began a debate regarding the New Hampshire
race on June 11. 53 The debate raged on throughout the summer with fifty-seven
Democrats ready to support Durkin’s installment as Senator, but sixty votes were
necessary to break a filibuster, and four Southern Democrats refused to vote with
their party’s position.54 The Senate’s stalemate on the issue was condemned in the
Washington Post declaring the Wyman v. Durkin contest a “disgraceful mess.” 55
Later, the Washington Post condemned the Senate as acting “petty” and “partisan.”56
The newspaper suggested a neutral was needed to resolve the dispute.57
As the debate continued in the Senate, Wyman independently contacted Durkin
in late July.58 Wyman suggested they face off in a new election.59 After some initial
hesitation, Durkin’s daughter changed his mind. Durkin’s daughter said “Dad,
don’t you realize [the Senate] can’t make their mind up about anything?”60 On July
29, Durkin announced to a New Hampshire television audience that he agreed to a
new election.61 Consequently, the U.S. Senate declared the New Hampshire seat
vacant on August 8, 1975; after nearly one hundred hours of debate over eight long

Foley, supra note 33, at 252. Pell’s suggestion was not a historical anomaly, in 1792, jurist
James Kent suggested the disputed 1792 New York gubernatorial election be resolved through a
tribunal like modern-day arbitration. Id. at 59–60, 252.

51

52

Id.

53

Kutner, supra note 45, at 30.

54

Foley, supra note 33, at 252.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

The Election Case of John A. Durkin v. Louis C. Wyman of New Hampshire (1975), United States
Senate [hereinafter United States Senate Election Case], https://www.senate.gov/about/originsfoundations/electing-appointing-senators/contested-senate-elections/137Durkin_Wyman.htm
[https://perma.cc/7HS4-TAS4].

58

59

Id.

The Associated Press, John A. Durkin, Winner of Close Senate Election, Dies at 76, N.Y. Times (Oct.
17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/us/politics/john-a-durkin-senator-from-newhampshire-dies-at-76.html [https://perma.cc/X9NY-BEYE].

60

61

United States Senate Election Case, supra note 58.
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months.62 The Senate would later reimburse Durkin and Wyman a combined total
of $227,000 (approximately $1,167,020.50 in today’s dollars)63 in legal fees for the
period from January to August 1975.64
After the Senate declared the seat vacant, Governor Thomson appointed former
Senator Norris Cotton to serve until the special election determined the victor.65 On
September 15, 1975, New Hampshire voters went to the polls and elected Durkin by
a decisively uncontestable margin of over 27,000 votes.66 On September 18, 1975,
Durkin was sworn in as Senator approximately ten months after the first election in
November 1974.67
Durkin later reflected on his contested election experience. Durkin stated he
would not wish such an experience on his worst enemy.68 “I’d much rather have read
about it than have lived it.”69
The 1974 Senate election in New Hampshire shows a better way forward must
exist for both citizens and candidates in contested Congressional elections. We
should not tolerate a state’s loss of representation in Congress for eight months.
That is why the author advocates for arbitration for resolving disputed
Congressional elections such as the 1974 New Hampshire Senate election.
II.

AN ARGUMENT FOR ARBITRATION IN DISPUTED CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS

This section seeks to vindicate Senator Pell’s wise suggestion to convene an
arbitration panel to assist the Senate in handling the contested 1974 New Hampshire
Senate election. Sending contested election disputes into the political den of wolves
that is the U.S. Congress proved calamitous in contests such as Wyman v. Durkin.70
This option resulted in costly attorney fees for the candidates (ultimately paid for by
taxpayers) and New Hampshire citizens having only one Senator for a period of
62

See Kutner, supra note 40, at 45.

Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2021, U.S. Inflation Calculator, https://www.usinflation
calculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates [https://perma.cc/T7PG-73AZ].

63

64

United States Senate Election Case, supra note 58.

65

See Osborne, supra note 19.

66

Id.

67

See Durkin Memoriam, supra note 24, at 10.

68

Winner of Close Senate Election, supra note 60.

Id. The New Hampshire race was not the only contested 1974 U.S. Senate election. The
Senate did not dismiss a challenge to Oklahoma’s Senate election until March 4, 1976, sixteen
months after the election was held. Foley, supra note 33, at 250.

69

70

See Rebecca Green, Arbitrating Ballot Battles, 104 Ky. L. J. 699, 702 (2015) [hereinafter Green I].
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eight months while the Senate debated the contest. 71 This section begins by
describing arbitration and its benefits. It then argues against the use of mediation
or litigation to resolve disputed elections.
A. Arbitration for Contested Election Disputes
Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) processes could help Congress settle
contested election disputes. Arbitration is an ADR process where one or more
neutrals render a decision for th e parties.72 The parties relinquish their decisionmaking right to a neutral who decides for them.73
Postelection disputes like Wyman v. Durkin are best-suited for arbitration
because such disputes often involve lingering tensions from the hotly competitive
campaign and time-sensitive concerns.74 Therefore, the neutral’s involvement must
be “more direct and decisive,” like in arbitration.75 The Wyman v. Durkin contest is
a case study highlighting such concerns. The candidates engaged in an aggressive
campaign and had difficulty meeting with each other.
Arbitration offers several attractive features that are particularly beneficial in
contested election disputes.76 An attractive feature of arbitration is that disputing
parties control who shall arbitrate their dispute.77 Afterall, people like to control
things that are important to them. 78 Giving disputants the ability to select
arbitrators offers flexibility and the ability to select experts on election law
disputes. 79 In the U.S, associations of arbitrators have developed such as the
American Association of Arbitrators (“AAA”) and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Service (“JAMS”).80 AAA and JAMS refer parties to lists of qualified arbitrators and

71

See United States Senate Election Case, supra note 58.

72

John W. Cooley, Mediation Advocacy 2 (2d. ed. 2005).

73

Id.

Erin Butcher-Lyden, The Need for Mandatory Mediation and Arbitration in Election Disputes, 25
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 531, 548 (2010).

74

75

Id.

76

Green I, supra note 70, at 703.

See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement
Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 122 Dick. L. Rev. 349, 371 (2017).

77

78

Brian S. Harvey, Speech, 8 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 385, 386 (2013).

79

Green I, supra note 70, at 705.

80

Id.

239

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

20:2 (2022)

their practice area specialties.81 On December 5, 2021, JAMS listed three neutrals
with practice experience in election law arbitration. 82 Additionally, arbitration
organizations like JAMS and AAA have developed stellar reputations because they
carefully vet arbitrators and maintain clear sets of procedural rules. 83
Consequently, these actions lend credibility and legitimacy to the use of arbitration
in resolving election law disputes.84
Control and flexibility are not the only justifications for arbitrating ballot
battles. Arbitration is a more expeditious process compared to litigation.85 First,
matters in arbitration are not constrained by an overburdened judicial system
creating long delays before disputes heard in court reach a final verdict.86 Second,
an arbitration panel is not necessarily bound by the rules of discovery and evidence,
meaning a final award is arrived at faster compared to traditional litigation.87 This
means that the uncertainty and drama that result from an election contest will be
over quicker and elected officials can focus on governing.88 And because arbitration
is expeditious, it is usually less expensive than typical litigation.89
These benefits have been recognized by many commentators who argue for
arbitration in election disputes. 90 But beyond commentators, these benefits are
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recognized by both states and the federal government in the election context.91 For
example, New York state created the now-defunct Board of Election Arbitration
which provided arbitration services for voters in an expeditious manner.92 Other
states, such as Connecticut and North Carolina, have implemented administrative
processes that resolve election disputes before advancing to the courts. 93 In
addition, the state of Minnesota utilized three-member ADR panels to resolve two
contested elections in the state: the 1962 gubernatorial election (decided by 89
votes) 94 and the 2008 U.S. Senate election in Minnesota (decided by 312 votes). 95
These states have served as “laboratories of democracy” and show arbitration and
other ADR processes can be used effectively across the U.S. to resolve disputed
elections.
However, it is not only the states that administer arbitration related dispute
resolution for election disputes, but the federal government does so too. The
Federal Elections Commission operates an ADR office to promote settlement
outside the traditional court adjudication process.96 The program was designed to
reduce costs, solve complaints faster, and bring cases to a mutually satisfactory
resolution. 97 Yet, the Federal Election Commission’s ADR program only resolves
federal campaign disclosure disputes and not all types of election law disputes.98
Nonetheless, the federal government like many states employs ADR programs to
resolve election-related disputes. It follows that amending the Federal Contested
Elections Act to require the parties engage in arbitration would not be an oddity in
See Jessica Becerra, The Possibility of Using Alternative Dispute Resolution for Election Law Disputes,
18 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 117, 126–28 (2018).
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dispute resolution regarding contested Congressional elections.
B. Why Arbitration is Better Fit to Resolve Disputed Elections Compared to
Mediation and Litigation
In this Article I argue arbitration is the best suited dispute resolution process
for postelection disputes. Yet, other commentators have argued for either
mediation 99 or litigation 100 as the proper method for resolving postelection
disputes. In this section, I argue both alternative options present significant
downsides compared to arbitration.
Mediation like arbitration is an ADR process that is less formal compared to
court adjudication. 101 Specifically, mediation is an ADR process where a
disinterested neutral assists disputants in reaching a voluntary settlement by
identifying mutual interests.102 Compared to court adjudication, mediation retains
many benefits associated with arbitration like procedural flexibility, cost savings,
and expediency.103 Unlike arbitration, the neutral does not render an award instead
the mediator assists the parties in reaching a mutually beneficial agreement.104 This
“essential distinction,”105 is precisely what makes mediation inferior compared to
arbitration for resolving postelection disputes. Due to the urgency in resolving
postelection disputes, it is necessary for the neutral to take an active role in deciding
the outcome instead of assisting the parties in reaching a settlement like in
E.g., Lawrence Susskind, Could Florida Election Dispute Have Been Mediated?, Disp. Resol.
Mag., Winter 2002, at 8, 10 (ambitiously arguing that Gore and Bush could have mediated the
contested 2000 president election through a settlement that might have (1) agreed to cooperation
and feedback on Supreme Court and cabinet appointments, and (2) agreed to bipartisan task
forces to develop policy proposals).

99
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Hill (Apr. 2, 2021, 5:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/546225-republican-electionhypocrisy-knows-no-limits [https://perma.cc/VM9S-L8AM] (“Courts should decide election
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mediation. 106 When election results are disputed, an expeditious decision is
important due to the public’s need for elected representation. 107 Therefore,
arbitration is better suited for postelection disputes compared to mediation.
While mediation is not appropriate for postelection disputes, it can work for
resolving pre-election disputes like campaign financing, ballot access, voter
identification, and advertising disputes.108 It has been suggested that pre-election
dispute mediators adopt an evaluative approach. 109 An evaluative mediator
“assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ positions so they can craft a
settlement that reflects the likely outcome at trial.” 110 By contrast, a facilitative
mediator will refrain from weighing in on the substance of the dispute or suggesting
options for the parties and instead facilitate a process in which the parties generate
their own options.111 The evaluative approach is likely superior for election disputes
because it helps alleviate potential information asymmetry between the parties and
it provides expertise to avoid unfair results.112
After disqualifying mediation as an alternative for resolving postelection
disputes, we now must consider court adjudication for election disputes, which is
the traditional path of resolving American postelection disputes.113 But litigation is
unsatisfactory for resolving postelection disputes. In Wyman vs. Durkin contest,
Durkin lodged multiple unsuccessful administrative and court challenges. 114 Yet,
court adjudication failed to end Durkin’s challenges, and he took his challenge to the
U.S. Senate—where debate on Durkin’s challenge went on for eight long months.
Ultimately, the courts were unable to reach a conclusive outcome regarding the
Durkin vs. Wyman contest.
Additionally, the judiciary has proven historically a poor option for resolving
106
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election disputes.115 Throughout history, partisan courts have stooped to political
interests over legitimate judicial outcomes.116 In the book, Ballot Battles, Professor
Edward Foley meticulously recounts multiple historical examples of courts
elevating partisanship over sound judicial decision making.117 Examples include the
one-party controlled Rhode Island Supreme Court disregarding the majority of the
voters’ will in the 1956 gubernatorial election by invalidating absentee ballots
“through a strained and unnecessarily technical interpretation of the state’s
constitution,”118 and the 1994 Alabama election for Chief Justice in which “renegade
jurists even had the chutzpah to proclaim the ballots valid despite the explicit
language of state law that provided otherwise.”119
Beyond historically justified concerns of partisanship over justice, courts
should welcome arbitration because it can alleviate the “taint” partisanship when
courts enter the political thicket of disputed elections. 120 Historically, the U.S.
Supreme Court was reluctant to weigh in on ballot counting disputes.121 As seen in
Taylor v. Beckham, wherein the Court held federal courts lacked the power to address
ballot counting disputes.122 This only changed when the Warren Court entered the
political thicket.123 Despite success in eliminating voting restrictions,124 the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding disputed elections has embroiled it in major partisan
disputes—when the public should strongly believe the judiciary is free of any form
of partisan influence.125 We need not look further than Bush v. Gore to see a negative
effect on the judiciary when it considers disputed elections.126 Justice Sandra Day
115
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O’Connor, the author of Bush v. Gore, would later reflect on the case saying, “ [Bush
v. Gore] stirred up the public,” and “ [Bush v. Gore] gave the Court a less-than-perfect
reputation.”127 In sum, the judiciary should welcome increased use of arbitration to
handle disputed elections to escape a political thicket and preserve the public
perception of judicial impartiality.
At bottom, we should consider Senator Pell’s wise suggestion to use arbitration
to resolve disputed elections because it offers control,128 arbitrator specialization,129
expeditious results, 130 cost-savings, 131 proven effective in past examples, 132 and
renders an award by a third-party neutral.133
III. AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONTESTED ELECTIONS ACT TO MANDATE
ARBITRATION

This section proposes that Congress amend the Federal Contested Elections Act
to mandate arbitration in contested election challenges.
A. Proposed Modification of the Federal Contested Elections Act
Mandatory Arbitration for Disputed Congressional Elections:
(A) “Arbitration” in this section means two parties meeting with an arbitration panel
that shall issue a decision regarding the contested election that shall advise the
House of Congress reviewing the disputed election.
(1) “Arbitration panel” in this section means a three-person panel of arbitrators.
Court Hijacked Election 2000 3 (2001) (“The five Justices who ended election 2000 . . . have
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a more enduring impact on Americans than the outcome of the election itself.”).
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Each party to the dispute will select one arbitrator of their choice. Each
disputant shall select only one arbitrator for a total of two arbitrators. Together,
the two disputant-selected arbitrators will pick the third arbitrator on the
panel.
(2) “Arbitration decision” in this section means the decision issued by the
arbitration panel. The arbitration decision requires a minimum of two
arbitrators to sign off on the decision unless none of the panel members can
agree to one decision. If two arbitrators cannot reach a decision, the third
neutral arbitrator selected by two disputant-appointed arbitrators will issue the
final decision for the panel.
(B) When a party files a challenge under the Federal Contested Elections Act,
Congress shall automatically send the dispute to mandatory arbitration.
(1) Congress shall send the dispute to arbitration and notify the disputants to
select their arbitrator within seventy-two hours of the election-related filing;
and
(2) The parties will have seventy-two hours from the date of notice to select their
preferred arbitrator. The two disputant-selected arbitrators will then have an
additional twenty-four hours to select the third arbitrator.
(3) The parties must meet in a public forum to begin arbitration within seventytwo hours of the selection of the third arbitrator.
(C) The process will not be confidential and any records from the process will be
open to the public to promote transparent and free elections.
(D) The procedural process of each arbitration will be selected by each arbitrating
panel with consideration of the timeliness of the issue. The arbitrators must select
either an arbitration process in which the rules of discovery and the rules of evidence
do not apply, or an arbitration process in which the rules of discovery and the rules
of evidence do apply.
(E) Awards and remedies are the same as those available in litigation.
B. Statutory Modification Analysis
This statutory modification combines the best aspects of arbitration and
lessons from prior disputed elections challenges. This section discusses the purpose
and effect of each statutory portion and how the statute improves upon the existing
process of handling disputed Congressional elections.
1.

Section (A)(1): The Three Person Arbitration Panel

This portion is based on the panels utilized in the 1962 Minnesota gubernatorial
election and the 2008 Minnesota Senate election, both disputed elections that used
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ADR panels.134 This proposed statute offers a hybrid of the two approaches. Like
both panels, the statute’s panel is composed of three members.135 The statute’s panel
like the 1962 panel allows the parties to select the arbitrators but differs slightly.136
The proposed panel lets each disputant select one arbitrator each. This proposed
panel still allows for party input and lets them control the process to an extent. But
the panel differs slightly and vests the final appointment with the parties’
arbitrators. This is like the 2008 panel where the panel was appointed by judges to
ensure diversity in arbitrator political affiliation.137 The 2008 Minnesota panel was
composed of a Republican, Democratic, and a politically unaffiliated arbitrator.138
This proposal gives the panel the power to prevent impasse between the disputants
by including the third arbitrator. An impasse is more likely to occur in the modern
political era because the Congressional polarization and gridlock is much more
common today than in 1962.139
2. Section (A)(2): Finality
This provision governs how awards are rendered. If two arbitrators on the
panel can agree upon an award the arbitration is settled. Yet, this provision ensures
that the arbitration panel can render an award in case the three-person arbitration
panel cannot reach a consensus. If an impasse occurs the decision of the third
arbitrator (the one appointed by the arbitrators) renders the award regarding the
disputed election.
3. Section B (1-3): Timeliness
Section B concerns timeliness. Arbitration offers parties a more expeditious
resolution.140 First, it requires Congress to send the dispute to arbitration within
twenty-four hours. Second, the statute requires each party select their preferred
arbitrator within twenty-four hours. Third, the two disputant-selected arbitrators
must select the third arbitrator within twenty-four hours. Finally, the section
ensures that the disputants and the three arbitrators meet in a public forum within
134
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twenty-four hours to resolve the dispute. This process ensures the dispute is heard
before a mutually agreed upon arbitration panel only four days after filing the
disputed election challenge in Congress. This avoids the problems that plagued
Wyman vs. Durkin where the U.S. Senate spent eight months debating the dispute
only to declare the seat vacant after the two candidates mutually agreed to hold a
special election.141 Meanwhile, New Hampshire citizens lacked full representation
in the Senate for those eight months. 142 We should utilize arbitration’s
expeditiousness to minimize disruption in Congressional representation.
4. Section C: Ensuring Transparency
Generally, confidentiality is considered “one of the principal advantages of
arbitration.” 143 Nonetheless, even though confidentiality is generally used in
arbitration agreements, it does not mean that confidentiality is assured in the
absence of a confidentiality agreement.144
Confidentiality is not appropriate for resolving disputed Congressional
elections. 145 Any sense that disputed elections are being resolved in secret will
drastically reduce the public’s willingness to accept the outcome.146 Consequently,
many states allow members of the public to observe the state’s review of disputed
ballots. 147 The 2008 Minnesota panel live-streamed its review of the disputed
ballots.148 In sum, confidentiality can ensure public acceptance of arbitration for
resolving disputed elections.
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CONCLUSION

In sum, Congress should amend the Federal Contested Elections Act to include
an arbitration panel provision to better resolve contested Congressional elections.
This Article considered the “closest election in U.S. history” the 1974 Senate Election
in New Hampshire which featured a drawn-out Senate hearing for eight months.
Ultimately, the Senate failed to resolve the dispute, and it only ended when the two
candidates on their own agreed to hold a new election. If the Senate had an
arbitration panel, the two candidates, Durkin and Wyman, may have agreed much
earlier to hold a special election to resolve their dispute. This would allow the Senate
to focus on other pressing national issues, reduce candidate legal fees, and restore
voter confidence during contested elections. Such a panel could assist both
Congress and candidates in handling disputed elections and resist partisan
temptation.149
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